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This article reviews cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in its 1976-1977 term.1 The decisions range from those
having some legal significance, to those which ought merely to serve as
reminders to attorneys, parties and courts of the nature and scope of their
powers and responsibilities, and of the need to be careful and.diligent. The
decisions are segregated into topical civil procedure categories.
JURISDICTION
Long Arm Jurisdiction
McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corporation2 raised the question of
minimal due process under the tortious act portion of the Illinois Long Arm
Statute3 in a defamation action in the Illinois district court. It was clear that
if a tort was committed, it was committed in Illinois. The only question was
whether subjecting the defendant to the in personam jurisdiction of the
Illinois district court comported with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The facts were that Beech, by its attorneys in Kansas, had brought an
antitrust suit, naming, among others, McBreen, the plaintiff in the Illinois
proceeding. Beech's Kansas counsel received a telephone call, in Kansas,
from a publication called Business Insurance. The lawyer did not know
where the call originated, but thought it had come from Masachusetts. a In
fact the call was placed from Chicago, which was Business Insurance's
place of publication and one of its areas of distribution. Shortly after the
telephone conversation, an article appeared in Business Insurance .
McBreen considered the article libelous and sued Beech and its Kansas
counsel in the Illinois federal district court.
The district court applied a rule of foreseeability, and held that regard-
less of where the Kansas attorney had believed the call originated from, he
* J.D., University of Minnesota, sole practioner in the antitrust, securities, and business
area.
1. The article covers cases decided by the Seventh Circuit between the Summer of 1976
and the Fall of 1977.
2. 543 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1976).
3. Ill. Civ. Prac. Act § 17, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 as applied through FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(e).
4. 543 F.2d at 28.
5. Id.
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should have been aware of the "nature and scope of distribution of Business
Insurance", and thus the possible effect of his remarks in Illinois. 6 The
Seventh Circuit rejected such a rigid formula.7 Instead, it looked to the
"quality and nature of a defendant's activity" and whether that defendant
"can be said to have invoked, by act or conduct, the benefits and protection
of the laws of the forum. "8 The court found that Beech's Kansas counsel did
not have sufficient contacts with Illinois to justify subjecting him to the
jurisdiction of the district court. 9
The court distinguished Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp. 10 and Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke,II on the ground
that while those cases involved single tortious acts, the defendants there had
placed their products into the ordinary course of commerce where the
product could be expected to come to Illinois.' 2 The court similarly distin-
guished the defamation cases against publishers who had placed their pub-
lications into the stream of commerce. 13 In McBreen, the Kansas lawyer
merely responded to a telephone call initiated by a reporter. He did not place
his statements into the "stream of commerce".' 4 The Illinois single tele-
phone call cases were also distinguished on the ground that the telephone
calls in those cases were initiated by the nonresident defendant.
15
Standing
The court dealt in two cases with the jurisdictional question of stand-
ing. In the first, City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe,16 Milwaukee sought declara-
tory and mandamus relief against the United States Attorney General to
prevent the Attorney General's continuing investigation of allegedly dis-
criminatory hiring practices by the city's police and fire departments. The
complaint basically alleged discriminatory enforcement, in that the Attorney
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 32.
10. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
11. 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
12. 543 F.2d at 29-30.
13. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Process Church of
Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. II1. 1972). The court noted contrary
authority but did not decide whether there is a different minimum contact standard for
defamation cases potentially involving First Amendment considerations, i.e. that greater
minimum contacts should be required. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th
Cir. 1966).
14. The result would be different if the non-resident defendant's participation in the
preparation of a publication were more extensive. Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D.
11. 1969).
15. Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 I1. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974); Cook
Assocs., Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 I1. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1973).
16. 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
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General was investigating the City of Milwaukee but not surrounding
communities, thus harming minority residents of the City of Milwaukee
who might be denied jobs in the police and fire departments of the surround-
ing municipalities.17 The Seventh Circuit found that Milwaukee had no
standing to bring such a complaint.18 There was no injury to its citizens
which it could claim in a representative capacity in that there was no
allegation that any surrounding municipality did in fact discriminate against
black, Spanish speaking or female citizens of the City of Milwaukee. 19
Moreover, there was no injury to the city itself. Even if discriminatory
enforcement were assumed, the fact that Milwaukee voluntarily spent
money in connection with the Attorney General's investigation designed to
achieve compliance with the Law of the Land is not a legal wrong or injury
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in the suit brought by the city.
The court did not remand with leave for the city to amend, as it found that
the district court lacked jurisdiction on other grounds.20
The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument in Saxbe that the district
court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 1361,21 which provides for man-
damus to compel officers or agents of the United States to perform a duty
owed the plaintiff. Mandamus is not available unless there is a clear right to
the relief sought, a clear duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in
question, and no other adequate remedy is available. 22 The court found no
clear peremptory duty requiring the Attorney General to investigate dis-
criminatory practices in any particular manner or order. 23
The Seventh Circuit similarly rejected jurisdiction in Saxbe under
section 1331,24 on the ground that the amount in controversy did not exceed
$10,000. The court compared the two rules concerning the determination of
the amount in controversy 25 (the value to the plaintiff of the right sought to
be protected or the pecuniary result for either party) and adopted the
approach which measures the amount in controversy by the value of the
right to be protected.26 In this case, it did not feel that the right of the City of
Milwaukee to be free from selective and discriminatory prosecution was
satisfactorily shown to exceed $10,000. The court again did not remand for
17. Id. at 696-97.
18. Id. at 698.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 699-703. See text accompanying notes 21-27 infra.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
22. State Dept. of Public Welfare of Texas v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 1304 (D.C. Tex.
1975); accord City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,691 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 927 (1976).
23. 546 F.2d at 701.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
25. 546 F.2d at 701-02.
26. Id. at 702.
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further consideration as it found that the city was not entitled to relief on
substantive grounds. It had not alleged intentional, purposeful discrimina-
tion, as opposed to selective enforcement having the effect of perpetuating
racial discrimination." In addition, the Attorney General is not required to
act simultaneously with respect to all violators of the law, nor does he forfeit
the right to bring any action against any violators by failing to so act.
In Mulqueeny v. National Commission on the Observance of Interna-
tional Women's Year, 19758 the Seventh Circuit dealt with standing in a
way that probably pleased the feminists of the Bar. Plaintiffs were chairper-
sons of an organization called "Stop ERA". This group was opposed to the
ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment and, apparently, was
also involved in anti-abortion activities. Plaintiffs sued seeking judicial
termination of the Commission and an order requiring the Commission to
return to the United States Treasury all monies which had been spent by the
Commission for the ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
and any other lobbying activities. 29 Alternatively, plaintiffs sought an in-
junction against the Commission to stop any activities designed to promote
ERA or pro-abortion positions, or to compel the appointment of persons to
the Commission who would balance its stances on the ERA and abortion.
30
Plaintiffs alleged they had standing because for several years they had
spent time, effort and personal funds carrying out educational programs
showing the harmful effect which would result from the ratification of the
proposed amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that all of this was in danger of
being destroyed by the Commission's illegal actions. 31 While eschewing
generalizations about standing, the court found that plaintiffs had suffered
no injury in fact: " '[M]ere interest' in the resolution of an issue, no matter
how compelling, no matter how vigorously and vocally expressed, is of
itself inadequate as a substitute for the Article HI requirement that a litigant
demonstrate personal, concrete injury."32 Even assuming injury in fact:
[P]laintiffs lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
court in that only through reliance upon the most speculative
inferences is a relationship between defendant's conduct and
plaintiffs' claimed harm apparent. It is wholly conjectural whether
the exercise of remedial powers possessed by the federal court, as
desired by plaintiffs, would result in the maintenance of the status
quo in the Illinois legislature's posture on the issue of ratifying the
Equal Rights Amendment.33
27. Id. at 703; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. 549 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. Id. at 1119.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1121.
33. Id.
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The "new" federalism asserts itself here. The courts may not be available
just because the other branches of government work slowly and may be
unresponsive. Standing does not come into being "merely because no other
individual is willing or able to vindicate a claim."
34
Miscellaneous Jurisdictional Cases
In Ktsanes v. Underwood35 an applicant for admittance to the Illinois
Bar clearly did not fit within the rules for admission and applied for an
exemption.36 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the exemption. The appli-
cant then filed a section 198331 civil rights action in the federal district court
attacking the constitutionality of the rule under which he had been excluded.
This question was not raised by the petition for exemption. The district court
dismissed.38 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court had juris-
diction to review the legislative standards for admission to the bar. The
court did not consider this collateral review of a state court action because
the state court made an administrative rather than a judicial decision.39 The
constitutional questions were first asserted in the district court and deserved
determination.
Plaintiff in 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton40 alleged
that he had no "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in the Illinois courts for
a wrongful tax assessment. 41 There was a pending state case in which the
same claims raised in the federal case could have been resolved. 42 Plaintiff
deliberately failed to raise the federal issues there. The Seventh Circuit
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that where a federal suit
is based on the absence of an adequate state remedy for a federal claim, and
the claimant purposely does not raise the issue in state courts, the federal
court has no jurisdiction to hear the case.43
ABSTENTION, STAY, DISMISSAL, ABATEMENT, FEDERALISM
Any attempt to understand Younger v. Harris,,' its companion cases45
34. Id. at 1122.
35. 552 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1977).
36. The applicant applied for admission on foreign license, but was denied admission
because he had once taken and failed to pass the Illinois bar exam.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
38. 552 F.2d at 741.
39. Id. at 743.
40. 551 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
76-1823).
41. Id. at 1094.
42. 28 East Jackson Enters. v. Rosewell, 65 III. 2d 420, 358 N.E.2d 1139 (1976).
43. 551 F.2d at 1095-96.
44. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
45. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971).
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and progeny,' is not likely to leave even the most assiduous scholar with a
clear and lucid definition of when one asks for or receives a stay, abates an
action, obtains a dismissal, asks for abstention, or what the result of any of
these orders will be in terms of further proceedings such as an appeal.
At least one decision of the Seventh Circuit affirmatively adds to this
general lack of lucidity. In Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will,n7 there were
identical state and federal actions pending. The only difference between the
two was that one claim based on rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 193448 was exclusively in the federal court. The plaintiff in the state court
proceeding (defendant in the federal proceeding) moved to "abate" the
federal action on the ground that its state action had been initiated first.
49
The district court entered an order "staying" all claims in the federal suit
except the 1Ob-5 claim. 5° At the same time the district court entered its stay
order, it heard an argument concerning whether a certain interest constituted
a security. This was the primary issue underlying the lOb-5 claim. The
district court failed to rule on that question and declined to permit interlocu-
tory review of its stay order. 5t The federal plaintiff filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus asking the Seventh Circuit to require the district court to
adjudicate its entire claim, i.e. to reverse its stay order and to rule on the
pending securities question.
The Seventh Circuit, relying on Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer,
52
ruled that the district court's stay order was proper at the time it was
granted. 53 Aetna involved an identical situation where a district court stayed
an action brought under rule lOb-5 in deference to state proceedings involv-
ing the same transaction where the lOb-5 claim was made an affirmative
defense. However, the Seventh Circuit in Calvert found that the subsequent
Supreme Court decision, Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States,54 made the district court's order improper. The Colorado
River case defined situations in which abstention is proper, a doctrine not
applicable in Calvert, and situations in which dismissal is proper where
concurrent jurisdiction exists between federal courts or state and federal
46. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800(1976);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
47. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No.
77-693).
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1970).
49. 560 F.2d 794.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
53. 560 F.2d at 795.
54. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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courts. Generally, the position of the Colorado River case is that a federal
court has an obligation to exercise its jurisdiction absent exceptional circum-
stances.5 5 Exceptional circumstances might include: (1) the assumption of
jurisdiction over a res by the state court; (2) avoidance of piecemeal
litigation; (3) inconvenience of the federal forum; and (4) the time sequence
in which jurisdiction was obtained by the two forums. 56 The Seventh Circuit
noted that Calvert differed from Colorado River in that the district court did
not dismiss, but had stayed all but the lOb-5 claim, which it retained but
refused to decide. 57 The Seventh Circuit dismissed this distinction, finding
that the effect of the district court's order was to preclude federal resolution
of the federal claims, making the order equivalent to a dismissal. 58 The
Seventh Circuit found no exceptional circumstances under the reasoning of
Colorado River and held that the rationale developed in Aetna could no
longer stand and Aetna should be overruled as a matter of law. 59 The writ of
mandamus was granted, and the district court was ordered immediately to
proceed to determine the claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.60
There are several points of confusion which arise from Calvert. The
court, in a footnote, stated: "In Aetna, we defined abatement 'as being the
overthrow of an action which defeats the action for the present but does not
debar the plaintiff from commencing it in a better way.' We assume that [the
judge] meant to use 'stay' as a synonym for 'abate.' "61 It is not clear how
abatement can be the same thing as stay. The court retains jurisdiction over
actions which are stayed. An abatement results in a dismissal. Different
consequences follow.
A more serious problem was raised in connection with the request for a
rehearing en banc on the question of overruling the Aetna case. Rehearing
was not granted, but four judges filed a statement which was appended as a
footnote to the opinion. 62 That statement noted that in overruling Aetna, the
Seventh Circuit apparently took from the district court the power to stay
proceedings, rather than merely finding that the district court abused its
55. Id. at 817.
56. Id. at 818.
57. 560 F.2d at 795-96.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 796.
60. Id. at 797. The court apparently did not know whether the state proceedings had been
concluded. It specifically stated that it did not decide whether the state proceedings, if they
were concluded, would be res judicata as to those portions of the federal complaint which the
district court had stayed. Nor did the court reach the "difficult issue" of whether the conclu-
sion of the state proceedings would have a collateral estoppel effect on the lOb-5 claim for
damages over which the court retained jurisdiction, but declined to resolve. Id.
61. Id. at 796-97 n.4.
62. Id. at 797 n.5.
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discretion in staying the particular proceedings involved in Calvert. The
statement rued the demise of Aetna in that its continued viability would at
most result in discretionary stays, not dismissals, as in the Colorado River
case. 63 The judges filing the statement attributed the result reached by the
panel to the fact that the case was there on mandamus, rather than appeal.
64
Mandamus would have precluded review of a discretionary stay. They
thought the panel erred in that the stay order might have been appealable in
this circuit, citing Drexler v. Southeast Dubois School Corp. ,65 and Vickers
v. Trainor.66 In neither of those cases, however, did the court directly
consider the question of appeal. The panel cited the Third Circuit case of
Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Association, P.A. ,67 for the unappeala-
bility of the order. Cotler did consider the issue, and it is true as a majority
rule that stay orders are not appealable except in certain exceptional circum-
stances 68
The result of the Calvert Fire decision, however difficult to fully
understand, may be favorable to those who advocate the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. It appears clear that in this circuit, when a case is properly
before the federal court, the first choice is that the federal court must
exercise its jurisdiction. When there are considerations of constitutional
adjudication and federal-state relations, the abstention doctrine may be
invoked only as "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."69 If the court
retains jurisdiction,7° the order will normally not be appealable, unless
somehow it falls within the scope of section 1292(b), 7 mandamus, or
perhaps, in a rare case, a doctrine like the collateral order doctrine of Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 72 In many cases, however, abstention
will result in dismissal.13 Indeed, dismissal will be the more usual result and
will give an automatic right of appeal. 7
Under circumstances "considerably more limited than the circum-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 504 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1974).
66. 546 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976).
67. 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975).
68. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955). See also Jackson
Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
69. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).
70. E.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
72. 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
73. Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975).
74. See a discussion of the difference between 'abstention' (retain jurisdiction) and
equitable restraint' (dismissal) in Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equi-
table Restraint: A Critical Analysis, (1976) DUKE L.J. 523.
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stances appropriate for abstention"," a district court may dismiss the action
before it, without prejudice. This seems to be the same thing as "abate-
ment", in spite of the panel's earlier cited footnote. 76 This order will be
immediately appealable as a final order.
The power to stay proceedings, at least where abstention or dismissal
would not be appropriate, will no longer remain in the district court. This
will probably be a boon to plaintiffs since the stay order would not have
been appealable. The ruling ought not to affect the power of the district
court to enter a stay under more routine circumstances.
Dema v. State of Illinois77 was a fairly straight-forward application of
the abstention doctrine. Plaintiffs there in effect sought to enjoin pending
state criminal prosecutions. Plaintiff's addition of a new party in the federal
court, which was an alter ego to other parties defendant, did not lend merit
to any arguments against abstention. 78 The federal case was dismissed. The
fact that the statute of limitations may run and thus bar an additional action
before the state court acts is not an argument against abstention as the parties
may seek review of whatever action is taken by the Illinois courts in the
Supreme Court of the United States, either by appeal as a matter of right, or
by writ of certiorari. 79
Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata National Corp. 80 represents a more
traditional problem concerning the entry of a stay order where two federal
courts are involved. The Seventh Circuit held that while many considera-
tions will enter into whether the court ought to stay its or the other court's
proceedings, the idea is to further efficiency, convenience, and to avoid
duplicate litigation.8 The fact that a second federal action ought to have
been filed as a compulsory counterclaim to a first federal action does not
resolve the issue of which proceeding ought to be stayed, though the order
of filing is entitled to weight. The ultimate goal is to expedite the completion
of the litigation.
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Tremps v. Ascot Oils Inc. 82 was the only case decided which dealt with
the problem of service of process. In Tremps, a complaint named as
defendant "James R. Cunningham, Jr." and identified him as President of
75. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
76. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
77. 546 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 226.
79. Id.
80. 552 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at 1261.
82. 561 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Ascot Oils, Inc. The summons served with the complaint identified the
defendant merely as "James R. Cunningham". Service of process was
made on the secretary of James R. Cunningham, Jr. and James R. Cunning-
ham, Sr. James R. Cunningham, Sr. was the party who should have been
named and served. There was no question that James R. Cunningham, Sr.
had actual notice of the lawsuit. 83 The court held that a defendant who is
clearly identified by summons and complaint and who has received actual
service may not avoid jurisdiction because of an incorrect name. 84 The court
seemed to favor the "objective" test; whether it is reasonable to conclude
that the plaintiff had that defendant in mind or whether plaintiff actually
meant to serve and sue a different person.8 5 The court suggested that other
more liberal standards might exist, as when there was a reasonable doubt or
confusion about who the plaintiff intended to sue, or when the defendant
would be required to answer a clearly ambiguous complaint. The court did
not need to choose a standard, however, because under the most liberal test,
Cunningham had been validly served.
PLEADING, AMENDMENTS
In Barnes v. Callaghan & Co. ,86 the plaintiff had filed an employment
discrimination suit in 1973. At the time of trial (1975), the plaintiff amended
her complaint to add a pendent claim for relief in slander.8 7 The district
court found that the slander count was not barred by the one year Illinois
statute of limitations 8 because "the gravamen of the original complaint was
clearly the injury to plaintiff's reputation and employment opportunity
occasioned by the alleged malicious conduct of the defendant." 8 9 A bench
trial of the civil rights claim was had and decided against the plaintiff, and a
jury trial of the slander case was decided in her favor. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the civil rights act finding and reversed the slander judgment on the
ground that the claim was barred by the Illinois statute of limitations. 9° The
court disagreed with the district court that the gravamen of the original
complaint was injury to the plaintiff's reputation. It found that Illinois, in an
action for slander, requires allegations of malice and publication. 91 The
original and amended complaints, prior to the fourth amended complaint,
did not contain those allegations.
83. Id. at 43-44.
84. Id. at 44.
85. Id.
86. 559 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1104.
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1975).
89. 559 F.2d at 1104-05.
90. Id. at 1105.
91. Id. at 1106.
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Preliminary injunctions are not easily available in the Seventh Circuit.
Failure to meet any of the requirements for preliminary injunction, 92 i.e.
adequate remedy at law, balance of interests, reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits, or disservice of the public interest, may result in the
denial or in affirmance of the denial of a preliminary injunction.
In Fox Valley Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products,
Inc. 93 plaintiffs argued that, where there was irreparable injury shown
(here, a termination of their business), and where the balance of hardships
weighed clearly in their favor, a preliminary injunction should be entered
without a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs
relied on the Second Circuit case of Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co. 94 The Seventh Circuit has never dealt squarely with this argument, and
it did not do so here:
In this circuit, we have cited Semmes, but not as eliminating the
need to show some likelihood of success. . . . [B]ut since in our
view [plaintiffs] have failed to show the lack of an adequate
remedy at law, it is not necessary for our decision to consider the
questions of likelihood of success in detail. 95
The court seems to fall back on a line of recent cases,' both published and
unpublished, holding that lack of an adequate remedy at law consists not in
being able to prevent a drastic harm-such as termination of an on-going
business-but lack of ability to carry on the actual court proceeding for
redress of the grievance. The court stated: "Because the loss of their
respective stores and in most cases sole livelihood, would have crippled if
not destroyed their ability to carry out their antitrust case, be granted relief
to the franchisees. The remedy at law would have become non-existent if
they lacked the ability to prosecute it." 97 This is a very narrow interpretation
of what constitutes an adequate remedy at law.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Three cases dealt with the propriety of granting summary judgment. 98
In Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric Credit Corp. ,99 the court held
92. See, e.g., Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Nuclear-Chicago
Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 465 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1972).
93. 545 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1976).
94. 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
95. 545 F.2d at 1098.
96. See, e.g., Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971).
97. 545 F.2d at 1098.
98. Choudry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977); People's Outfitting Co. v. General
Electric Credit Corp., 549 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1977); Askew v. Bloemaker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.
1976).
99. 549 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1977).
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summary judgment to be inappropriate in a contract case where one of the
issues involved the defendant's intent to obligate itself. "Issues of intent are
particularly inappropriate for disposition under Rule 56."100 In addition,
noting that summary judgment is to be granted with caution, the court found
a factual dispute with regard to whether the parties intended to be bound by
an oral agreement based upon several documents, in spite of the deposition
testimony of an officer of the plaintiff corporation that oral conversations
were reduced to writing and there were no oral agreements. 101 Again, it was
a question of contractual intent making summary judgment inappropriate.
In a different context, intent barred the granting of summary judgment
in a civil rights action arising out of the mistaken raid of plaintiff's home by
federal drug enforcement agents. A valid defense would have been a
showing that the officers believed in good faith that their conduct was
lawful, and that that belief was reasonable. The officers filed affidavits to
that effect. The court in Askew v. Bloemaker'02 held that such affidavits
stated only conclusions and were entitled to "little weight on a motion for
summary judgment." 03 The affidavits contained nothing to show that there
was no material issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the officers' belief,
and there was a wide range of evidentiary material available to the district
court controverting the officers' conclusionary assertions with specific facts.
"Cases in which motive and intent play a leading role are particularly
inappropriate for disposition on a motion for summary judgment." 1°
In Choudhry v. Jenkins ,105 also a civil rights case, summary judgment
was entered against the plaintiff by the court without motion of any party,
and without notice to any party, and after hearing evidence and argument
solely on the question of whether a temporary restraining order should issue.
A rule 12(b) motion to dismiss had not even been filed. In addition, the
court in hearing the temporary restraining order had specifically limited its
consideration to that question alone. 106 The Seventh Circuit held that with-
out a rule 56 motion from a party, or a rule 12(b) motion which might be
treated under rule 12 as a motion for summary judgment, the district court
normally lacks power to enter a summary judgment. 10 Instances suggested
as an exception to this general rule are where issues are submitted to the
court under such circumstances as to constitute a waiver of the notice and
hearing requirements of rule 56.108 The court cited a case where the parties
100. Id. at 45.
101. Id. at 46.
102. 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 679.
104. Id.
105. 559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977).
106. Id. at 1088.
107. Id. at 1088-89.
108. Id. at 1089.
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agreed at a pretrial conference to submit certain issues of law for decision by
the court, °0 thus, in effect conceding that there were no essential facts in
dispute. In that situation, the filing of a motion for summary judgment
would have been a mere formality. That was not the case in Choudhry, and
the summary judgment was reversed.
MULTIPLE PARTIES OR CLAIMS
In Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 10 an interesting
situation involving third party claims and an insurer's duty to defend arose.
The second buyer of an allegedly defective product sued the first buyer and
the manufacturer. The manufacturer tendered the defense to its insurer
which denied coverage based on a contractual endorsement which provided
that the insurer would "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured by reason of the liability assumed by him under any written contract
shall be legally obligated to pay. . . ." I Thereafter the first buyer filed a
crossclaim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer failed to tender the
defense of the crossclaim to its insurer. The manufacturer and the first buyer
were held jointly liable to the second buyer." 2 The district court entered
summary judgment against the insurer, finding that it had a duty to defend
the manufacturer regarding the cross-complaint." 3 As the crossclaim was
the only claim in which there may have been a written contract and,
therefore, insurance coverage, the Seventh Circuit held that the failure to
tender that defense defeated the manufacturer's claim against the insurer. 
114
The district court's finding of summary judgment against the insurer was
reversed.
CLASS ACTIONS
Two cases of significance arose regarding class actions.115 The first
may be a setback for consumer class actions. Winokur v. Bell Federal
Savings and Loan Association,116 was brought on behalf of a class of
depositors against a class of savings and loan associations. Plaintiff alleged
misrepresentations in advertising regarding the computation of interest earn-
ings. The district court refused certification of the defendant class on the
grounds that the numerosity requirements were not met and there were not
questions of law and fact common to the defendant class because each
109. United States v. Fisher-Otis Co., 496 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973).
110. 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. Id. at 683.
112. Id. at 682.
113. Id.
114. Id. at685,
115. Sussman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say.
and Loan Assoc., 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977).
116. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977).
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savings and loan association had different interest practices and advertise-
ments. 117 The court also refused to certify the plaintiff class because there
were too many individual questions of fact and the named plaintiffs were not
typical of the class. They knew of the bank policies and did not rely on
misconceptions as to interest practices. "8 The district court refused to make
a finding under section 1292(b) 119 permitting an interlocutory appeal. Plain-
tiffs filed an appeal anyway which was dismissed. Defendants thereafter
tendered to plaintiffs $12.00 each plus costs. At that point in time, all parties
conceded that the interest practices were changed so that the representations
made in advertising were accurate. The district court then dismissed the case
as moot, from which plaintiffs filed a second appeal. 120 Plaintiffs contended
that if the merits were decided in their favor, they would be entitled to
attorneys' fees from any fund recovered for the benefit of the plaintiff class.
The court discussed a number of Supreme Court decisions,'21 and drew
the following generalizations with regard to appealability of class certifica-
tion questions. 122 First, if a class has been certified and the named party
thereafter loses his individual interest, adjudication on the merits is
nevertheless appropriate as class members are represented by the named
party and there is still a live controversy. Second, if there is no class
certification and the named party loses his individual interest, further adjudi-
cation is not appropriate because there is no controversy. Third, where class
certification is denied and the trial court determines the claim on the merits,
the named party may seek review of the denial. Fourth, where class certifi-
cation is denied and the named party elects not to seek review, a member of
the proposed class may promptly intervene and seek such review. The court
recognized the case as fitting within the second generalization 123 and found
no controversy.
The court stated that while the change in defendants' practices resulted
in greater allowances of interest than some depositors may have had under
old practices, "plaintiffs' lawsuit could equally have resulted in defendants'
continuing the practices but inserting additional statements in the advertise-
ments to obviate plaintiffs' objections to them." 124 The court concluded that
117. 58 F.R.D. 178, 180 (N.D. I11. 1972). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
118. Id. at 181-82.
119. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1970) (permits appeals of otherwise non-appealable orders where
the district court is of the opinion that the order involves a controlling issue of law).
120. 560 F.2d at 274.
121. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Kremers v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S.
128 (1975).
122. 560.F.2d at 277.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 274-75.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
there would "clearly be no occasion for an allowance of attorneys' fees even
if plaintiffs achieved a favorable decision on the merits." 125 The question of
attorneys' fees alone did not provide plaintiffs with a stake in the contro-
versy on the merits.
Though the relief suggested by the Seventh Circuit is a possibility, it
would seem equally possible that, assuming misrepresentations were
proven, depositors would be awarded the greater allowances of interest to
which they would have been entitled had defendants' practices comported
with their advertisements instead of an injunction banning such advertising.
Thus, the court's opinion seems more interested in disposing of the case
short of the merits than total accuracy in the reasoning by which the court
arrives there. Alternatively and conceivably, the court might have reached
the class action question, determined that the district court was correct in
denying class certification, and proceeded to find that the case was indeed
moot on appeal. The court refused to do that.
A petition for rehearing was filed and denied.' 26 Judge Luther N.
Swygert was alone in voting for a rehearing en banc and filed a statement to
that effect. 127 Judge Swygert found himself unable to subscribe to a rule
which insulated from appellate review "a decision denying class certifica-
tion solely because a defendant tendered a few dollars to a putative class
representative.' 128 He suggested unfortunate consequences for future
consumer class actions in that defendants may now have the "arbitrary
power to bar appellate review by simply tendering the damages claimed by
the putative class representative." 1
29
The only counterweight to Judge Swygert's concern is rule 23(e). 
13
0
Once a class action is filed, regardless of whether there has been certifica-
tion of the class, there is some authority that it may not be dismissed or
compromised without court approval."' The very fact of district court
review may prevent some of what could be the worst consequences of the
Winokur decision. If the Seventh Circuit is going to reach the Winokur
result, it should at least make clear that forced review at the district court
level of settlements is required even without class certification. Otherwise
unfortunate or even collusive settlements will be encouraged.
In a second class action case, the Seventh Circuit dealt with a problem
which is of growing concern: adequacy of representation and conflict of
125. Id.




130. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
131. See Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. III. 1970); 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1797, pp. 236-7 (1969).
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interest between the plaintiff class and its attorneys. In Sussman v. Lincoln
American Corp. ,132 the court found that the plaintiffs would not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class when one plaintiff was an
attorney practicing with the attorney of record in the class action; a second
plaintiff was the mother of the first attorney/plaintiff; and the second
attorney of record for the plaintiffs rented and shared office space in the
same suite of offices as the plaintiff/attorneys' law firm. In addition, the
potential recovery for the individual plaintiffs was significantly less than the
attorneys' fees which might have been generated from the suit. The interest
of the plaintiffs in the law firm presents a possible conflict of interest. This
would not be altered even if the plaintiff/attorney waived the fees; it is not
clear that such fees can be waived and there would still be the appearance of
a conflict of interest.
In a consolidated case, 133 the plaintiff was the brother of one of the two
attorneys representing the plaintiff. The second attorney rented and shared
office space in the same suite with the first attorney. The district court held
that where an individual plaintiff is represented by a member of his im-
mediate family and/or one of his relatives' close associates, class certifica-
tion is not appropriate. 134 Plaintiffs appealed, characterizing the district
court's rule as a per se approach and suggested that the adequacy of class
representatives be determined under the same rules as applied to fiduciaries
acting on behalf of others in a non-class action context. Plaintiffs argued that
there should be a showing of an actual danger of conflict of interest rather
than the mere possibility of conflict.
The Seventh Circuit cited authority from other jurisdictions which
apparently creates a per se rule that refuses to permit class attorneys, their
relatives or business associates from acting as the class representatives. 1
35
The court affirmed the lower court's decision in the consolidated cases, but
it did not adopt the per se analysis. It found, that "without regard" to
waiver of fees, there was a likelihood of a conflict of interest. 136 The court
stated:
We find that the district judge was acting well within his discretion
in strictly applying the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) where the
close relationship between plaintiff and counsel creates an inher-
ent conflict of interest. We note, however, that judicial control
over class settlements and attorney's fees might, under other
circumstances, provide adequate protection for the due process
rights of the absent class members.1
37
132. 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).
133. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).
134. 72 F.R.D. 187, 190 (N.D. III. 1976).
135. 561 F.2d at 93. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3rd Cir.
1976).
136. 561 F.2d at 95.
137. Id. at 96.
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The Due Process clause requires that represented parties adequately protect
the interest of absent class members. Since the requirement has a constitu-
tional basis, it is not clear when someone closely related to a class represen-
tative might not affect the adequacy of representation. Nevertheless, the
court left the possibility open.
DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL PREPARATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) 3 8 requires a party to supple-
ment interrogatory answers if he obtains information "upon the basis of
which (A) he knows the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows
that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the
circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a
knowing concealment."' 39 Plaintiff in Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Robertshaw
Controls Co. 140 discovered that sanctions will be applied when there is a
failure to comply with the rule and supplement interrogatory answers.
Plaintiff in Holiday Inns sued to recover damages from a fire in a deep
fat fryer manufactured and sold by the defendant. The district court held that
the fire was caused because plaintiff's personnel used insufficient grease to
cover the unit's heating elements. 14' The lower court refused to consider an
alternative theory that the unit was unreasonably dangerous because it
lacked an oil level sensing device that would shut the fryer off if the oil level
fell below the heating elements. The court based its refusal to consider the
theory on a response plaintiff made to an interrogatory asking whether there
were any parts or components that were defective or dangerous. 142 Plaintiff
had responded only with respect to a temperature control thermostat. De-
fendants were informed of the new theory four days before trial. Plaintiff's
failure to disclose its new theory was not salvaged either by a pre-interroga-
tory boiler plate in the complaint, or by a post-interrogatory letter in which
plaintiff stated "that the design of the appliance leaves something to be
desired", but did not mention that the letter was intended to supplement the
interrogatory answer. 
143
In a case that will warm the hearts of many excellent pre-federal rule
trial lawyers who often had to try cases with very little discovery, the
Seventh Circuit in Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Systems,
Inc. '" held that a district court lacked the authority to compel a plaintiff to
conduct discovery instead of permitting the plaintiff to litigate the entire suit
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
139. Id.
140. 560 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 857.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 857-58.
144. 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977).
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at trial. 145 In Identiseal, a pretrial conference was held. The district court
issued an order concluding that pretrial work necessary to try the action
efficiently had not been done."6 The court ordered the action dismissed for
want of prosecution, and stayed the order for approximately two months. 1
47
The court stated that the order would be vacated if plaintiffs' counsel during
the period of the stay conducted specified discovery and submitted a new
pretrial order. Plaintiffs' attorney moved to vacate the order and filed an
affidavit of counsel stating that he had " 'made a considered judgment that
discovery would in no way be beneficial to the plaintiff's interest and would
at most be of some significant support or assistance to the defendant.' "148
Plaintiff's counsel argued that the order exceeded the district court's power.
The district court acknowledged the argument that it might not compel a
litigant to conduct discovery, but did not reach the issue because it held that
plaintiff had also failed to file the pretrial report called for in the earlier
order.149 The action was dismissed without prejudice.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court's dismissal of the
complaint based on failure to file a pretrial report could be upheld only if the
court's earlier order compelling plaintiff to conduct discovery could be
upheld, as plaintiff had previously filed a pretrial order containing all of the
information which, without discovery, it had. 150 The court found no power
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'51 to compel discovery. It similarly
found no power in federal rule 16 governing pretrial procedure. Rule 16
only requires the parties to appear and "consider the possibility of admis-
sions of which would lessen task at trial. "152 The plaintiff did not engage in
conduct which could be characterized as a failure to prosecute, for he was
ready to go to trial but merely disagreed with the district court about the
desirability of discovery. The Seventh Circuit specifically noted that its
decision was based on more than the absence of express authority to compel
discovery in rule 16. "It is also based on the traditional principle that the
parties, rather than the court, should determine litigation strategy.'
' 5 3
In J.F. Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail
Corp. ,154 the parties were unable to agree upon a stipulation of facts in
145. Id. at 302.
146. Id. at 299.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 300.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 301.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. These federal rules pertain to discovery and depositions. The
language throughout these rules is permissive in character, stating only what a party may do to
obtain discovery.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
153. 560 F.2d at 302.
154. 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976).
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conjunction with a required pretrial order. The district court struck all of the
pleadings of the party it considered to be in default and entered judgment
against that party and in favor of other parties subject to proof of the amount
of damages. 155 The parties who benefited by the district court's "draconian
orders" relied on rule 16 governing pretrial procedures, and a local standing
order on pretrial conferences to support the district court's actions. The
Seventh Circuit held that rule 16 and the local rule merely require the parties
to confer for the purpose of generating stipulations, which should be en-
couraged. 256 Nothing in rule 16, however, empowers a court to compel the
parties to stipulate facts. Nor does the failure to agree, assuming the parties
have conferred, constitute a failure to prosecute as to warrant dismissal or
any other sanction. ' 57 The court noted:
Even if Rule 16, as enforced through Rule 41(b) or the court's
inherent ability to control its own docket, had empowered the
court to compel parties to stipulate, [the district court] would have
been constrained to fix an 'appropriate measure of discipline' on
any recalcitrant counsel. [Citation omitted.] The ultimate sanction
of dismissal should be utilized only in the face of conduct so
reprehensible that no other alternative sanction would protect the
integrity of the pre-trial procedures contemplated by Rule 16.158
The court further found that none of the sanctions of rule 37159 were
available for failure to stipulate facts, and could find no other source of
power for such an order. 160 Nevertheless, the court added in a final footnote:
If further discovery or other pretrial matters remain to be
completed, the next trial judge should attempt to control any
undue rigidity of counsel for any of the parties. Sanctions are
often available to counter pre-trial recalcitrance, even though not
authorized for failure to agree on a stipulation of facts.
161
JUDGMENTS
In Hahn v. Becker 162 the court considered whether a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to rule 50(b) 163 must be
served within 10 days after entry of judgment, or merely had to be filed
within 10 days after entry of judgment. Rule 59(b)164 and (e) 165 relating to
motions for new trial or motions to alter or amend judgments specifically
require that the motion shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of
155. Id. at 1321.
156. Id. at 1322.
157. Id. at 1323.
158. Id. at 1324.
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
160. 542 F.2d at 1325.
161. Id. at 1326 n.14.
162. 551 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1977).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
164. Id. at R. 59(b).
165. Id. at R. 59(e).
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judgment. Rule 50(b), provides that: "not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have
the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judg-
ment entered in accordance with this motion .... ",166 Although the court
found that it was probably the intent of the drafters of rule 50(b) that the time
limitation therein be the same as the time limitation for new trial or motions
to alter or amend judgments, the wording was nevertheless different and did
not give a party notice of the precise intent. 167 Therefore a rule 50(b) motion
need only be filed within 10 days after entry of judgment, and must be
served within a reasonable time thereafter.
In Ben Sager Chemicals International, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co. ,168
judgment was entered against one defendant for failure to comply with
discovery requests. Thereafter, the plaintiff and a second defendant entered
into a settlement agreement. The agreement provided that plaintiff would
assign its judgment against the first defendant to the second defendant. The
second defendant agreed to collect the judgment, and the agreement
contained a schedule for dividing the proceeds. 169 Based on this settlement,
the remainder of the suit was dismissed. Some months later the second
defendant sought to execute judgment against the first defendant, who
promptly filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) 17° and (6)171 for relief from judgment.
The grounds asserted by the defendant for rule 60 relief were the
neglect of counsel in failing to inform its client that the case was removed
from state to federal court, that requests for production of documents and
other discovery had been submitted, and that the court had ordered sanctions
and a default judgment against the defendant because of a failure to comply
with the discovery requests. The defendant also claimed diligence in deter-
mining the status of the case because on several occasions it had inquired
about the case and defendant's counsel had assured it that the case was
coming along fine. In fact, defendant's counsel was disbarred at some point
during the course of the events.
The district court found that the defendant's counsel's action did not
constitute excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1). 172 Even assuming relief
were available under 60(b)(6) to a diligent client where an attorney's actions
are grossly inexcusable, the court nevertheless denied relief on the grounds
that the client was not in fact diligent and that the plaintiff and the second
166. Id. at R. 50(b).
167. 551 F.2d at 744.
168. 560 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1977).
169. Id. at 808.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
171. Id. at R. 60(b)(6).
172. 560 F.2d at 809.
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defendant had relied on the default judgment in entering into a settlement
agreement. Moreover, the district court noted that the defendant had avail-
able the remedy of suit for malpractice.' 
73
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court in its denial of relief under
rule 60(b)(1) in the absence of any showing which would have justified the
neglect of counsel. 174 The court then discussed a split in authority under rule
60(b)(6) under which some courts hold that gross negligence of counsel will
support relief,175 while others hold that the gross neglect of a freely chosen
counsel is the neglect of the client, and is, therefore, cognizable only under
rule 60(b)(1). 176 The Seventh Circuit declined, however, to adopt either
rule, finding only that there was "neither evidence as to why [counsel]
neglected to comply with discovery nor [a] showing that defendant diligent-
ly watched over the lawsuit.'
'1 77
In United States ex rel. Hi-Way Electric Co. v. Home Indemnity
Co. ,178 the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to
stay enforcement of a registered foreign judgment. The foreign judgment
creditor had initially sought enforcement of the judgment in the state courts
of Illinois and only when confronted with a possibility of a set-off did it seek
to register the judgment in the federal court. 179 The state court had earlier
stayed enforcement proceedings while the set-off was being determined.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court had the power to stay the
enforcement of a registered judgment under rule 62(f) i80 and the same
discretion to do so as it had on a motion seeking to stay an original
proceeding in the district court. 18' The court held that a stay should have
been granted because of the judgment creditor's conduct in the state court.
LAW OF PRIOR ADJUDICATION
In Butler v. Stover Brothers Trucking Co. 182 plaintiff sought to recover
for personal injuries suffered in a collision involving three tractor-trailers.
Plaintiff was in one truck, a driver named Paulson was in a second truck
owned by Stover Bros., and a man named Gutkowski was in a third truck
owned by Container Corporation of America. Gutkowski was killed in the
accident. His widow brought suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 809-10.
176. Id. at 810. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); United States v. Cirami, 535
F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976); Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967).
177. 560 F.2d at 811.
178. 549 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1977).
179. Id. at 11.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(f).
181. 549 F.2d at 11.
182. 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977).
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against Stover Brothers and Paulson.' 8 3 There was a jury verdict against
defendants in the state court suit.
Plaintiff in Butler filed a motion for summary judgment in the district
court on the question of defendants' negligence, asserting that the defend-
ants were collaterally estopped from contesting negligence in the district
court since they had enjoyed a full opportunity to litigate the question of
negligence in the prior state suit. 1" The district court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although not
resurrecting the mutuality requirement for the application of collateral estop-
pel, the court believed it necessary that the party against whom the estoppel
is to be applied have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
prior proceeding, "and that application of the doctrine will not result in an
injustice under the particular circumstances of the case." '1 85 Under the
circumstances it would be unfair to allow plaintiff to benefit by the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel when one of the defendants had been prevented
from testifying in the prior state court suit because of invocation of the
Illinois Dead Man Act. 86 If the plaintiff in the federal case had participated
in the state trial, the defendant's testimony would have been admissible
against this plaintiff. Therefore, it would be inequitable to place him in a
better position in the federal court than that which he would have enjoyed in
the state action, solely because of the identity of parties.
In Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois,'87 the plaintiff was sus-
pended from the practice of law. He was later pardoned by President Ford
and moved for reconsideration of his suspension in the Illinois Supreme
Court. 188 The petition was denied, and plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States which also was de-
nied.189 Plaintiff then filed a federal complaint asking the district court to
issue a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of Illinois to reinstate him,
and to issue a declaratory judgment that his suspension was null and void.
The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata bars
any further litigation of the question, as the same question had been con-
sidered judicially by the Illinois state courts. 
190
REVIEW ON APPEAL
Predictably, there were a number of cases decided by the Seventh
183. Id. at 545-46.
184. Id. at 548.
185. Id. at 551.
186. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1975).
187. 557 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1977).
188. Id. at 123.
189. In re Grossgold, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
190. 557 F.2d at 124-25.
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Circuit dealing with the appealability of various kinds of orders, the scope of
review on appeal and the timeliness of appeals. Following is a summary of
those decisions.
With regard to appealable orders, in Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings
& Loan Association191 the court held that an order denying certification of a
class was not appealable when the case thereafter becomes moot as to the
named parties. In C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan International
Company ,192 the court held an order denying a stay pending arbitration
appealable under the rule of Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger,193 which
allows appeals when the action in which the order was made is an action
which, before the fusion of law and equity, was by its nature an action at
law, and the stay was sought to permit the prior determination of some
equitable claim or defense. In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers
Local Union 77,194 the court held a contempt order appealable under section
1291195 as a final order where it found that the contempt was criminal rather
than civil. Appellate review was limited, however, to errors in the contempt
proceeding and not to the validity of the underlying order. In United States
ex rel. Hi-Way Electric Co. v. Home Indemnity Co. 196 the court held
appealable as a final order under section 1291197 a district court's order
denying a motion for stay of enforcement of a registered foreign judgment.
In Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc. 198 the court permitted an appeal
from a district court order compelling the defendant's attorney to withdraw
because of the appearance of a conflict of interest. Such an order is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp. 199 Finally, in Velsico Chemical Corporation v. Parsons,200 the court
permitted appeal of a motion to compel testimony and production of docu-
ments from a corporation's officers and attorneys, by the corporation, which
had been granted leave to intervene under authority of Perlman v. United
States.2° ' The corporation would have no way to protect its rights in the
absence of such an appeal, which becomes a final order under section 1291.
In Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc. 202 the court dealt with the scope
of review on appeal. An interlocutory appeal was taken in Stern pursuant to
191. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977).
192. 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
193. 348 U.S. 249 (1955).
194. 555 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1977).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
196. 549 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1977).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
198. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
199. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
200. 561 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1977).
201. 247 U.S. 7 (1917).
202. 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977).
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section 1292(b). 203 The court would not permit appellees to present on
appeal a theory which was not made a part of the controlling question of law
certified by the district court and was not included in the grounds for the
petition for leave to appeal filed thereafter.
In Butler v. Stover Brothers Trucking Co.2 4 the question of the
timeliness of an appeal was raised. On December 12, 1975, a jury found for
the plaintiff, and on the same day the clerk prepared and signed a judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. 205 Post-trial motions were
filed and on February 3, 1976, denied by the court. Additional motions were
heard by the court on March 25, 1976. Neither the court nor counsel was
aware at that time that the clerk had, on December 12, 1975, entered a
judgment on behalf of plaintiff. 206 The court, on March 25, 1976, ordered
entry of judgment. Defendants filed a notice of appeal on April 20, 1976.
Plaintiff argued that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that it was
not timely filed. The Appellate Court found the review timely. The clerk's
duty to enter judgment under rule 58207 was ministerial only. The trial judge
had indicated after the return of the verdict that judgment would not be
entered until after ruling on defendants' post-trial motions. 20 8 Although this
did not constitute a direct order to the clerk not to enter judgment, the clerk
should have been put on notice. Therefore, the clerk acted beyond the scope
of his authority under rule 58, the December 12th judgment was void, and




In Denofre v. Transportation Ins. Rating Bureau210 judgment was
entered on May 20, 1977. A bill of costs was not filed until June 21, 1977.
The court held that while the clerk of the court of appeals had the power "at
any time' to add a bill of costs to a mandate after its issuance, nevertheless,
a bill of costs will not be allowed if not filed within the fourteen day time
limit of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(c) 211 absent a showing of
good cause for the delay. 212 Mere inattendance to the daily chores of a law
office is not a good cause.
213
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
204. 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
206. 546 F.2d at 547.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
208. 546 F.2d at 546.
209. Id. at 548.
210. 560 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1977).
211. FED. R. APP. P. 39(c).
212. 560 F.2d at 860-61.
213. Id. See also Bonds v. Callahan & Co., 559 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1977) with regard to
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc. 214 the court extended its
holding in Denofre to make clear that the time for filing a bill of costs on
appeal is not extended by a motion for a rehearing, but the bill is due within
14 days of the entry of judgment.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNSEL, PARTIES AND COURTS
It is difficult to read through all of a term's cases on civil procedure and
not be struck by the number of instances in which counsel, courts, or parties
either lacked something in diligence or precision or failed to live up to their
responsibilities in some respect. It is appropriate to conclude this article with
a catalog of the major faults of this kind which the Seventh Circuit dealt with
this past term.
Counsel
First, traveling around or inattendance to affairs of a normal law office
is not an excuse for failure to file a timely bill of costs.215 Second, filing a
conclusory post-trial motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e)216 does not toll the 30 day period of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a) 217 for filing an appeal. The motion pursuant to the rule must
state with particularity the grounds therefor. The failure of the motion to do
so may not be rectified by setting forth the grounds in detail in a brief. The
rule "is based on important substantive policies, the finality of judgments
and its application is required here by prior rulings of this court.,, 2 18 Third,
failure to supplement discovery where required 219 may result in being barred
from offering proof of the additional material at trial. 22° Fourth, failure of
counsel in a case involving multiple parties and claims to tender the defense
of each possible claim to the client's insurer may result in waiver of any
rights to have the insurer later defend those claims.22' Fifth, where conclu-
sory pleading is utilized, the court "will not strain to find inferences
favorable to the plaintiffs which are not apparent on the face.' '222 Moreover,
it is the duty of counsel when a complaint is dismissed to request leave to
amend. If leave to amend is never sought, the trial court will not be in error
if it dismisses the action with prejudice.
filing a bill of costs at the district court level within the 10 day time limit provided in a local rule
without a showing of excusable neglect within Rule 6(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
214. 560 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1977).
215. Denofore v. Transportation Ins. Rating Bureau, 560 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1977).
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
217. FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
218. Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977).
219. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).
220. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1977).
221. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1977).
222. Coates v. Illinois State Board of Educ., 559 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1977).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Parties
First, a party is under an affirmative duty to diligently follow the
progress of litigation in which he is involved. If his counsel is negligent, or
even grossly negligent, and this results in a default judgment, the party may
not be able to have the default set aside. His only remedy may be that of a
suit for malpractice-a remedy which may not always be effective.223
Second, if a party has actual knowledge of a suit against him, even if he is
incorrectly identified in the summons and the complaint, he is nevertheless
within the jurisdiction of the court, and ignores the suit at his peril.224
Courts
First, district courts in diversity cases should include in their opinions
their determination of what law was applied.225 Second, trial courts may not
compel a party to conduct discovery in order to comply with that court's
pretrial order procedure. 226 Third, a court may not award summary judg-
ment, nor should it really take other important procedural steps, without a
warning to the parties and an opportunity to make a proper record. 227
Otherwise the appellate court will be confronted with
one of those troublesome cases in which an appeal follows a
disposition occurring by way of procedures amounting to some-
thing less than a full trial and which . . . presents serious pro-
cedural questions in a record situation wherein further attention at
the trial court level with rectification of any procedural errors
conceivably could be followed by the same result as before in thelitigation. 22
Fourth, a court should state reasons for its rulings. For example, if it denies
leave to intervene it should state why, thus making review of the court's
exercise of discretion easier for the appellate courts .229 Fifth, a district court
must not go outside of the record, relying on subjective impressions rather
than objective record facts. Stay of a concurrent federal proceeding, and the
subsequent vacation thereof on the basis of such "impressions" results in
delay rather than expeditious handling of litigation. 230 Sixth, a court may not
compel a party to enter into a stipulation of facts, as part of the pretrial order
procedure, though the parties must confer in an attempt to do so. 231
223. Ben Sager Chem. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1977).
224. Tremps v. Ascot Oils, Inc., 561 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1977).
225. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1977).
226. Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., Inc., 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977).
227. Choudry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977) (court entered summary judgment
without motions by the parties or notice by the court).
228. Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1977).
229. Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977).
230. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat. Corp., 552 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1977).
231. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir. 1976).
